21.06.2012, 18:09
I finished reading this book a few days ago. It was fascinating.
The importance of Stalingrad to victory for the Allies is explained well in this book. Much of Russia's food, fuel, weapons, and other crucial supplies
came through southern Russia, mostly by the Volga River at that particular time. The whole country was barely able to feed its soldiers and population during the entire "Battle of Stalingrad". Occupation by the Axis forces for a substantial amount of time in the southern region could have put Russia out the war. It could have allowed the Axis to get desparately needed Caucasus oil for the Nazi aspirations of conquest.
Adolf Hitler's obession with huge Stalingrad, even willing to take it house by house - contrary to sound military doctrine, is explained by Beevor. Another blunder
was dividing the strategic objectives, Stalingrad and the Caucasus, while weakening the forces sent to accomplish them. Meanwhile, the timeframe was
expected to still be met. There were delays caused by Hitler himself while he blamed his soldiers and mostly his generals. He could never admit his own mistakes or that
the enemy had far more reserves than he assumed. Antony Beevor explains how the decisions by Hitler drove the course of events to the unnecessary suffering of
soldiers and civilians of both sides. Everything was directly or remotely connected to the decisions of Adolf Hitler. The Fuhrer believed that an army could get everything it needs if it succeeds in advancing. In desperation of orders to stay on schedule and the realities of an army with a ravenous appetite, the Germans took everything that they needed or could use from civilians or those abandoned by Russian forces . Hitler counted on his Allies of Italy and Romania to guard his flanks and keep pace, even on crowded country roads. The German supply lines extended too far with a crippling winter coming to hinder Blitzkrieg, Hitler gambled everything on winning southern Russian before the onset of the worst weather.
Joseph Stalin had his own set of obsessions. Ironically, Stalin had nearly given victory to Hitler's blunder by believing that a German offensive was coming farther north - probably flanking the Moscow region from a southerly direction. Stalin hesitated for weeks; reasons are given by the author. It was nearly a catastrophy for Russia because of this. Advanced German troops were reaching the Volga River in several places on the east of Stalingrad, having crossed the city, as Russian reserve forces were only beginning to enter the fight on that same day. Orders to shoot anyone who retreated actually caused some to surrender to the German army. Lack of equipment and supplies forced surrender sometimes in mass to the Wehrmacht especially in areas surrounding Stalingrad in the region. Commands for frontal attack caused many Russian soldiers to die unnecessarily. The order to shoot retreaters and deserters also had the effect of making the common Russian soldier endure far beyond what was thought possible, which allowed the Russians to win many critical smaller battles or endure longer than the German troops, dying in masses on the path to ultimate victory. The irony is that the orders of Stalin which could have caused catastrophe were mitigated by Hitler's blunders.
Despite local Romanian commanders who tried to warn feverishly of a Russian build-up for offensive operations and the lack of containment ability in the thin Romanian line, no significant German reinforcements were sent to aid them. Even after an open break in the Romanian line to the north, after a brave but futile Romanian resistance, with Russian tanks and infantry in fast advance in open country, orders from Fuhrer headquarters were for German forces to continue pushing east. However, Hitler seldom viewed detailed descriptions of battlefield conditions, therefore the Russian trap was sprung without the Fuhrer's awareness. By the time the danger was clear to everyone with Russian armor cutting the path of retreat, still Hitler ordered advance! A relief operation by General Von Manstein came too little and too late.
The conditions of Russian and Axis forces were appalling as the arrival of a very hard Russian winter compounded all problems enormously. Commanders and officers on both sides struggled to keep control of the battles, their own troops, domestic and enemy prisoners, and deal with civilians. For many, the most difficult challenge was the winter itself with sub-zero temperatures, late or cut supplies, and often late, little or no medical attention. Common soldiers were thrown into the furnace of war with often little concern, awareness, or ability to improve their state of being. Russian forces entered this conflict already on meager food rations while German forces began fairly well but saw supplies in every category slowly slip into little or nothing by the end of the campaign.
In Stalingrad itself, the front lines were blurred with enemies often in the same block, trench, or building and the firing upon friendly troops being a constant risk. There were millions of cases of intrigue, disobedience, atrocities, and acts of compassion among units of all forces in the region, all grotesquely effecting the cruel outcome in Stalingrad. Added to these are the rivalries of commanders and officers, which Beevor cleverly uncovers with interesting insight. A number of civilians, perhaps in the tens of thousands from outside and inside Stalingrad, took shelter in the city during the battle. All the while, artillery and aircraft rained death from the sky.
The campaign took victims by starvation, disease, combat, and exposure to the weather. It must have seemed like one hellish mess to most people directly involved in the region. Uncertainty must have been among the worst things to endure.
It was a shock to Adolf Hitler that so many of his soldiers would disobey him and surrender. It was equally a shock to Joseph Stalin how many of his soldiers would wear German uniform and how common civilians would collaborate with the Axis forces, some being imagined or mistakingly reported as such. It is difficult given the amount of information in the book to determine which regime was more paranoid. Many innocent people-soldiers and civilians-were persecuted or suffered directly otherwise because of this.
Never the less, Adolf Hitler and his regime deteriorated, while Joseph Stalin learned from his mistakes and his regime would bring Russia to Super Power status after the war.
By the time of Axis collapse in the region, the end of the suffering was far from ended. Some of the costs, casualties, and consequences of the campaign
for Stalingrad are given with sophisticated insight by the author, Antony Beevor, in the final few chapters of the book. There is, the author seems to offer, justice of
various kinds in life - and in regard to Stalingrad.
Published in 1998 and possibly revised later, you may find your fine copy of "Stalingrad" by Antony Beevor in bookstores, public libraries, and the Internet.
Fireskull
The importance of Stalingrad to victory for the Allies is explained well in this book. Much of Russia's food, fuel, weapons, and other crucial supplies
came through southern Russia, mostly by the Volga River at that particular time. The whole country was barely able to feed its soldiers and population during the entire "Battle of Stalingrad". Occupation by the Axis forces for a substantial amount of time in the southern region could have put Russia out the war. It could have allowed the Axis to get desparately needed Caucasus oil for the Nazi aspirations of conquest.
Adolf Hitler's obession with huge Stalingrad, even willing to take it house by house - contrary to sound military doctrine, is explained by Beevor. Another blunder
was dividing the strategic objectives, Stalingrad and the Caucasus, while weakening the forces sent to accomplish them. Meanwhile, the timeframe was
expected to still be met. There were delays caused by Hitler himself while he blamed his soldiers and mostly his generals. He could never admit his own mistakes or that
the enemy had far more reserves than he assumed. Antony Beevor explains how the decisions by Hitler drove the course of events to the unnecessary suffering of
soldiers and civilians of both sides. Everything was directly or remotely connected to the decisions of Adolf Hitler. The Fuhrer believed that an army could get everything it needs if it succeeds in advancing. In desperation of orders to stay on schedule and the realities of an army with a ravenous appetite, the Germans took everything that they needed or could use from civilians or those abandoned by Russian forces . Hitler counted on his Allies of Italy and Romania to guard his flanks and keep pace, even on crowded country roads. The German supply lines extended too far with a crippling winter coming to hinder Blitzkrieg, Hitler gambled everything on winning southern Russian before the onset of the worst weather.
Joseph Stalin had his own set of obsessions. Ironically, Stalin had nearly given victory to Hitler's blunder by believing that a German offensive was coming farther north - probably flanking the Moscow region from a southerly direction. Stalin hesitated for weeks; reasons are given by the author. It was nearly a catastrophy for Russia because of this. Advanced German troops were reaching the Volga River in several places on the east of Stalingrad, having crossed the city, as Russian reserve forces were only beginning to enter the fight on that same day. Orders to shoot anyone who retreated actually caused some to surrender to the German army. Lack of equipment and supplies forced surrender sometimes in mass to the Wehrmacht especially in areas surrounding Stalingrad in the region. Commands for frontal attack caused many Russian soldiers to die unnecessarily. The order to shoot retreaters and deserters also had the effect of making the common Russian soldier endure far beyond what was thought possible, which allowed the Russians to win many critical smaller battles or endure longer than the German troops, dying in masses on the path to ultimate victory. The irony is that the orders of Stalin which could have caused catastrophe were mitigated by Hitler's blunders.
Despite local Romanian commanders who tried to warn feverishly of a Russian build-up for offensive operations and the lack of containment ability in the thin Romanian line, no significant German reinforcements were sent to aid them. Even after an open break in the Romanian line to the north, after a brave but futile Romanian resistance, with Russian tanks and infantry in fast advance in open country, orders from Fuhrer headquarters were for German forces to continue pushing east. However, Hitler seldom viewed detailed descriptions of battlefield conditions, therefore the Russian trap was sprung without the Fuhrer's awareness. By the time the danger was clear to everyone with Russian armor cutting the path of retreat, still Hitler ordered advance! A relief operation by General Von Manstein came too little and too late.
The conditions of Russian and Axis forces were appalling as the arrival of a very hard Russian winter compounded all problems enormously. Commanders and officers on both sides struggled to keep control of the battles, their own troops, domestic and enemy prisoners, and deal with civilians. For many, the most difficult challenge was the winter itself with sub-zero temperatures, late or cut supplies, and often late, little or no medical attention. Common soldiers were thrown into the furnace of war with often little concern, awareness, or ability to improve their state of being. Russian forces entered this conflict already on meager food rations while German forces began fairly well but saw supplies in every category slowly slip into little or nothing by the end of the campaign.
In Stalingrad itself, the front lines were blurred with enemies often in the same block, trench, or building and the firing upon friendly troops being a constant risk. There were millions of cases of intrigue, disobedience, atrocities, and acts of compassion among units of all forces in the region, all grotesquely effecting the cruel outcome in Stalingrad. Added to these are the rivalries of commanders and officers, which Beevor cleverly uncovers with interesting insight. A number of civilians, perhaps in the tens of thousands from outside and inside Stalingrad, took shelter in the city during the battle. All the while, artillery and aircraft rained death from the sky.
The campaign took victims by starvation, disease, combat, and exposure to the weather. It must have seemed like one hellish mess to most people directly involved in the region. Uncertainty must have been among the worst things to endure.
It was a shock to Adolf Hitler that so many of his soldiers would disobey him and surrender. It was equally a shock to Joseph Stalin how many of his soldiers would wear German uniform and how common civilians would collaborate with the Axis forces, some being imagined or mistakingly reported as such. It is difficult given the amount of information in the book to determine which regime was more paranoid. Many innocent people-soldiers and civilians-were persecuted or suffered directly otherwise because of this.
Never the less, Adolf Hitler and his regime deteriorated, while Joseph Stalin learned from his mistakes and his regime would bring Russia to Super Power status after the war.
By the time of Axis collapse in the region, the end of the suffering was far from ended. Some of the costs, casualties, and consequences of the campaign
for Stalingrad are given with sophisticated insight by the author, Antony Beevor, in the final few chapters of the book. There is, the author seems to offer, justice of
various kinds in life - and in regard to Stalingrad.
Published in 1998 and possibly revised later, you may find your fine copy of "Stalingrad" by Antony Beevor in bookstores, public libraries, and the Internet.
Fireskull