17.11.2009, 09:16
OK, I'll bite...
Deac, you're over-simplifying, to put it mildly. You're looking at in terms of "X plane is better than Y plane" rather than in terms of two different doctrines that pre-date the introduction of the Lancaster and B-17 to the bombing campaign, and have their origins in the pre war years.
Your argument to me looks like "because the B-17 was better, it fought during the day. Because the Lancaster wasn't, it fought at night"
Now I don't want to get into the relative merits of the two aircraft, because that's pretty much subjective. I think what you're ignoring is that the RAF commenced night-time operations almost 2 years before the Lancaster became operational. Also another thing to consider was that it was in RAF doctrine from it's very inception in 1918 to be able to strike at day and night and aircraft were designed with this in mind. Now, due to various pre-war political and economic factors crew training and equipment wasn't exactly at it's best at the start of the war, and there was still a painful switch to night operations, obviously due to the dangers of navigating halfway across Europe in the dark. So i'd be wrong in saying RAF aircrew were expert night-flyers from the start as the accuracy statistics wouldn't support me, but what i'm trying to say is the RAF had resources and training with night operations in mind.
The switch was obviously prompted by the daytime losses of unescorted and obsolete bombers attempting to penetrate German airspace during 1939-1940. Those tactics proved to be unworkable and unprofitable as the RAF couldn't support that kind of attrition rate in it's bomber force for very long. Night time ops seemed the to be only choice.
Daylight operations with Lancasters and Halifaxes did commence during 1944-45 when it was safer to do so.
Enter the USAAF in 1942, who believed that greater accuracy meant total destruction of more targets in a shorter time. An they'd be right as it stands to logic. However it's all well and good saying that while you're cruising over a bombing range in the desert without a cloud in the sky and all the time in the world. But throw in the poor European weather, smoke screens, flak and fighters and things change rapidly. The US were experiencing the same thing that the Luftwaffe had experienced in the BOB and the RAF had experienced over Germany during the "phony war" However the USAAF stuck to their guns.
It's my understanding that the US didn't have the capacity for night bombing operations, the crews weren't trained extensively in night flying/bombing and the same navigational aids that the RAF had. Not that i'm trying to be unfair to the USAAF crews and say they were inferior, it just wasn't part of USAAF doctrine to bomb at night, as I understand it. Another thing to add is that the USAAF had escort fighters in the form of P-38's and P-47's with the range to protect the bomber formations at least part of the way. Something that the RAF lacked during 1939/40. The USAAF experimented with night bombing for a couple of months during 1943 (possibly in light of the horrific losses over Schweinfurt) and found it to be unworkable. Another thing to consider is that even if the USAAF wanted to re-train it's pilots in night bombing it couldn't. The tempo of operations couldn't slow down as the the Germans would repair the bomb damage and give them time to redistribute their factory complexes rendering all previous bombing raids useless. That was why the same targets were bombed multiple times. The strategic bombing campaign was a massive cat and mouse game with the USAAF/RAF trying to get a stranglehold on the German economy.
I don't want this to turn into a "who's air force is better than the other's" pissing contest, as we're off-topic enough, but I just wanted to highlight that the differences in tactics have their orgins way deeper than "teh B-17 is l33t".
Deac, you're over-simplifying, to put it mildly. You're looking at in terms of "X plane is better than Y plane" rather than in terms of two different doctrines that pre-date the introduction of the Lancaster and B-17 to the bombing campaign, and have their origins in the pre war years.
Your argument to me looks like "because the B-17 was better, it fought during the day. Because the Lancaster wasn't, it fought at night"
Now I don't want to get into the relative merits of the two aircraft, because that's pretty much subjective. I think what you're ignoring is that the RAF commenced night-time operations almost 2 years before the Lancaster became operational. Also another thing to consider was that it was in RAF doctrine from it's very inception in 1918 to be able to strike at day and night and aircraft were designed with this in mind. Now, due to various pre-war political and economic factors crew training and equipment wasn't exactly at it's best at the start of the war, and there was still a painful switch to night operations, obviously due to the dangers of navigating halfway across Europe in the dark. So i'd be wrong in saying RAF aircrew were expert night-flyers from the start as the accuracy statistics wouldn't support me, but what i'm trying to say is the RAF had resources and training with night operations in mind.
The switch was obviously prompted by the daytime losses of unescorted and obsolete bombers attempting to penetrate German airspace during 1939-1940. Those tactics proved to be unworkable and unprofitable as the RAF couldn't support that kind of attrition rate in it's bomber force for very long. Night time ops seemed the to be only choice.
Daylight operations with Lancasters and Halifaxes did commence during 1944-45 when it was safer to do so.
Enter the USAAF in 1942, who believed that greater accuracy meant total destruction of more targets in a shorter time. An they'd be right as it stands to logic. However it's all well and good saying that while you're cruising over a bombing range in the desert without a cloud in the sky and all the time in the world. But throw in the poor European weather, smoke screens, flak and fighters and things change rapidly. The US were experiencing the same thing that the Luftwaffe had experienced in the BOB and the RAF had experienced over Germany during the "phony war" However the USAAF stuck to their guns.
It's my understanding that the US didn't have the capacity for night bombing operations, the crews weren't trained extensively in night flying/bombing and the same navigational aids that the RAF had. Not that i'm trying to be unfair to the USAAF crews and say they were inferior, it just wasn't part of USAAF doctrine to bomb at night, as I understand it. Another thing to add is that the USAAF had escort fighters in the form of P-38's and P-47's with the range to protect the bomber formations at least part of the way. Something that the RAF lacked during 1939/40. The USAAF experimented with night bombing for a couple of months during 1943 (possibly in light of the horrific losses over Schweinfurt) and found it to be unworkable. Another thing to consider is that even if the USAAF wanted to re-train it's pilots in night bombing it couldn't. The tempo of operations couldn't slow down as the the Germans would repair the bomb damage and give them time to redistribute their factory complexes rendering all previous bombing raids useless. That was why the same targets were bombed multiple times. The strategic bombing campaign was a massive cat and mouse game with the USAAF/RAF trying to get a stranglehold on the German economy.
I don't want this to turn into a "who's air force is better than the other's" pissing contest, as we're off-topic enough, but I just wanted to highlight that the differences in tactics have their orgins way deeper than "teh B-17 is l33t".